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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of collateral for small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the context of Visegrad countries: Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland. The data set for this paper was obtained from the 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which was con-
ducted by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) from 2012–2014. A binary logistic regression model with different specifications 
was employed to examine the effect of independent variables on the incidence of collat-
eral. The results show that risky borrowers need to pledge collateral and the reduction of 
asymmetric information can lower the incidence of collateral for SMEs. Moreover, we 
find that female borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral than male borrowers are. 
The results also suggest that loans with a longer maturity are more likely to be collateral-
ized than short-term loans. We find evidence that bank-borrower proximity can alleviate 
the incidence of collateral whereas bank concentration may increase collateral require-
ments. Policy makers may consider these results to implement policies that can promote 
bank competition and can lower collateral requirements for female borrowers. The paper 
contributes to the ongoing debate on the determinants of collateral.
Keywords: SME finance, collateral, asymmetric information, bank competition, distance, 
Visegrad countries. 
JEL classification: G21, G32, O16.
Introduction
Financial constraints on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are an open scien-
tific research topic for academicians and practitioners due to the immense importance 
of SMEs to the economic development of a country. Lack of financing availability for 
SMEs not only hinders new business establishment but also hampers the economic 
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growth of countries because of fewer jobs. Ayyagari et al. (2007) found that SMEs con-
tribute about 60% of jobs in the manufacturing sector in their analysis of 70 developing 
and developed countries. Beck et al. (2006) state that SMEs report higher financing dif-
ficulties than large firms do and the effects of financing obstacles are greater for SMEs. 
SMEs face stringent credit conditions from banks because it is contended that SMEs 
are information opaque and usually cannot produce audited financial statements when 
they are seeking bank financing (Berger, Udell 2002). Studies based on relationship 
lending suggest that small firms that engage in long-term relationships with their banks 
can overcome the asymmetric information problem (Carter et al. 2004; Berger, Udell 
2006). However, information generation through relationship lending is costly and, con-
sequently, banks are shy to lend to SMEs (Beck, De La Torre 2007). Due to this infor-
mation mismatch between lenders and borrowers, commercial banks impose restrictive 
loan contract terms on SMEs to prevent defaults (Garcia-Teruel et al. 2014). Hence, this 
asymmetric hidden information may lead to credit rationing because it is difficult for 
the banks to evaluate the quality of the borrowers (Stiglitz, Weiss 1981). SME business 
conditions and financial environments are not competitive enough, and therefore SMEs 
may find it difficult to manage their credit risk properly and thus face strict terms when 
applying for bank loans (Belas et al. 2015; Lenka et al. 2014). 
Imposing collateral requirements on a loan contract is a traditional bank practice to 
eliminate information opacity and to align the interest of borrowers with the interest of 
banks (Besanko, Thakor 1987; Boot et al. 1991). Beck et al. (2006), using the World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES), find that collateral requirements are the third 
of 12 most important financing obstacles for SMEs. Results from the EBRD and World 
Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance survey (BEEPS) in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia indicate that collateral is the fourth most important financing 
obstacle for external loans. Prior literature suggests that collateral can alleviate adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems in a loan contract because collateral can act as a 
signalling device for banks to sort out quality borrowers from risky ones (Bester 1985; 
Chan, Kanatas 1985; Besanko, Thakor 1987; Boot et al. 1991). Bester (1985) shows 
that when borrower quality is unknown, banks can use collateral as a screening device 
to differentiate between good and bad borrowers. In the face of high asymmetric infor-
mation, quality borrowers may pledge more collateral to show their credit quality by 
which they can avail loans with lower interest rates because their probability of default 
is lower (Bester 1985; Chan, Kanatas 1985; Besanko, Thakor 1987). On the contrary, 
when borrower quality is known and risky, banks will require higher collateral and 
charge higher interest rates (Jimenez, Saurina 2004; Brick, Palia 2007). This selection 
of borrowers based on their observable credit quality is known as the observed risk 
hypothesis. The observed risk hypothesis predicts that banks sort borrowers depending 
on their risk profile and results in risky borrowers having to pledge collateral and higher 
interest rates to compensate the risky investment by banks. 
The role of collateral as a screening device is prominent in banking studies that find 
that if collateral minimizes adverse selection, pledging collateral can have a negative 
relationship with credit risk (Jimenez et al. 2006; Godlewski, Weill 2011). Collateral 
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requirements on loan contracts and the observed risk hypothesis have also received 
utmost attention from researchers. However, these studies are concentrated on a single 
country and dominated by the US market (Leeth, Scott 1989; Berger, Udell 1990, 2006; 
Brick, Palia 2007; Han et al. 2009; Berger et al. 2011), with a handful concentrated on 
the European market (Cowling 1999 – UK; Jimenez, Saurina 2004 – Spain; Hernandez-
Canovas, Martinez-Solano 2006 – Spain; Duarte et al. 2016 – Portugal). There are 
studies based on cross-country analyses but they cover both developing and developed 
markets (Godlewski, Weill 2011; Duarte et al. 2017). Although, different authors ex-
amined the issue of collateral based lending in different markets, however, it is still an 
interesting topic for researchers because some loans are provided without any collateral 
security whereas others require pledging collateral (Steijvers et al. 2010).
In this paper, we focus on Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hun-
gary, and Poland) to find the determinants of collateral for small business lending. We 
have purposefully selected Visegrad countries for our research. Because to the best of 
our knowledge, there is no empirical research that is investigated the issue of collateral 
based lending in the context of Visegrad countries or in a cross-country European set-
ting. By doing so, we can extend the current state of the literature on collateral require-
ments for SME loans. Moreover, Visegrad counties are an integral part of European 
economic system and SMEs in the Visegrad countries contribute the largest portion of 
employment. Empirical research by Ayyagari et al. (2007) find that SMEs create about 
65% of the jobs in the Czech Republic, 63% in Poland, 59% in the Slovak Republic 
and 46% in Hungary. Additionally, Daszkiewicz (2014) in his research finds that in 
2012, SMEs counted for 99.8% of enterprises in the Czech Republic and in Poland, 
similarly, 99.9% enterprises are counted for SMEs in the context of Slovak Republic 
and in Hungary, respectively. 
Likewise, we are interested in these countries because, during the worldwide financial 
crisis, business activities of SMEs in the Visegrad countries significantly suffered due 
to lack of finance from banks (Korab, Pomenkova 2014). Korab and Pomenkova exam-
ined pre and post financial crisis period and access to finance for SMEs in the Visegrad 
countries. They find that SMEs in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic show a 
greater reduction in loans than of the other two countries (Hungary and Poland) and they 
have a very limited access to finance during the period of financial crisis (2008–2009) 
in comparison to pre-crisis period (2006–2007). Hence, above studies suggest that in 
general, SMEs are financial constraints than the large firms and credit market contrac-
tion is making it even harder for SMEs to raise external finance for investment.
The European market is significantly different from the US or other market-based sys-
tems because in Europe, bank loans are the main source of business financing. Accord-
ing to the Survey on the Access to Finance in the Euro Area (SAFE 2015), 42% of the 
SMEs operating in 2012 faced a lack of access to financing and among these SMEs, ap-
proximately 74% reported bank loans as relevant to their capital structure. Furthermore, 
like other European countries, our examined countries are dominated by SMEs and they 
have momentous importance for the economic development of the country. Hence, con-
sidering the importance of SMEs in our examined countries, finding the determinants 
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of collateral can be valuable not only for researchers but also for practitioners to know 
more about the incidence of collateral during the loan acquisition process.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides theoretical and empiri-
cal evidence on the incidence of collateral and the factors that affect collateral. Section 
2 describes our data set, variables and method. In section 3, we present our results and 
discussion. The paper concludes with main findings, recommendations and scope for 
future study. 
1. Collateral-based lending and the determinants of collateral
Collateral requirements on a loan contract are particularly significant for SMEs com-
pared to large firms because they lack physical assets to pledge as collateral to the 
banks, which may cause SMEs to be credit rationed (Menkhoff et al. 2006). Addition-
ally, SMEs are owned and managed by individuals and, hence, personal characteristics 
and private wealth of the borrower can have a greater impact on the business perfor-
mance of SMEs than large firms (Bolton Committee 1971; Tirole 2010). According to 
Ang et al. (1995), the influence of the personal wealth of SME borrowers can assist in 
obtaining bank financing because, at times, personal wealth is inseparable from business 
assets. In that case, an individual can pledge personal assets as collateral to the banks 
and obtain financing.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that collateral-based lending can generate benefits for 
the lenders, such as alleviation of the agency problem by which collateral can prevent 
asset substitution and hold back firms from borrowing excessively. Asset substitution 
may arise when the borrowing firms divert from their intended projects to other risky 
projects with anticipated higher returns. Furthermore, Myres (1977) shows that collat-
eral might reduce the underinvestment problem. An underinvestment problem occurs 
when there is a tendency of managers to invest in risky projects with lower net present 
value, which reduces the value for shareholders and transfers the wealth to unsecured 
debt holders. Additionally, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) report that collateral security can 
minimize banks’ loss exposure and, as a result, it may facilitate easy access to financing 
by alleviating credit rationing. 
Numerous studies show that bank-borrower relationships can lower the collateral re-
quirements for firms. Relationship lending minimizes the information gap and helps 
banks to predict the quality of projects more accurately, which reduces collateral require-
ments from borrowers (Degryse, Van Cayseele 2000; Chakraborty, Hu 2006; Gama, Du-
arte 2015; Rahman et al. 2016). Nonetheless, relationship lending is a labour intensive 
process and can increase the loan process cost for lending institutions as a result of fre-
quent visits to the firms to acquire soft information (Petersen, Rajan 2002). Furthermore, 
studies show that relationship lending may instead increase collateral with the duration 
and scope of a relationship due to a lock-in situation with banks caused by excessive 
information sharing (Lehmann, Neuberger 2001; Jimenez et al. 2006). Jimenez and 
Saurina (2004) show that relationship-lending loans are riskier than non-relationship 
based lending, as relationship lending involves a less restrictive loan screening process 
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and increases the default rates. It is argued that the importance of relationship lending 
in alleviating information asymmetry is decreasing with the use of credit rating models 
and availability of accounting-based hard information (Petersen, Rajan 2002; Jimenez 
et al. 2006). Jimenez et al. (2009) find that accounting-based hard information can be 
a substitute for collateral because it makes the loan screening process more accurate.
As discussed, collateral requirements on loan contracts are quite common in the credit 
market to align the interest of the borrowers with the interest of the banks. However, 
there are differences between firms that provide collateral and those that do not. Thus, 
depending on firm characteristics, collateral requirements can differ and are a main area 
of empirical study of this paper. Moreover, based on loan characteristics (loan size, 
maturity and interest rates) collateral requirements may vary, as different categories of 
loans might have idiosyncratic risk classifications. Additionally, credit market imperfec-
tions can have a significant impact on the incidence of collateral because not all markets 
are competitive or efficient enough to remove anomalies in the loan market. The situ-
ation is worsened by the distance between lenders and borrowers. Distance makes it 
more difficult for lenders to justify the viability of borrowers’ projects (Petersen, Rajan 
2002), which can impose collateral burdens for more distant borrowers (Jimenez et al. 
2006). Thus, in this paper, we would like to evaluate the effect of firm characteristics, 
loan characteristics and market characteristics on the incidence of collateral. 
1.1. Firm characteristics
Information asymmetry is one of the main problems faced by SMEs when seeking bank 
loans because they cannot show their credit quality. This limited information about the 
SMEs create barriers in accessing bank financing and, hence, banks impose different 
credit restrictions on SME loans to overcome this asymmetric information problem, 
for example, collateral, high interest rates, shorter maturity and covenants. Scholars 
frequently use firm size and age as inverse proxies for information asymmetry in SME 
lending and find that information transparency reduces collateral requirement. In this 
paper, we examine the impact of asymmetric information on the incidence of collateral 
with four inverse proxies for information asymmetry (firm size, age, audited financial 
statement and asset tangibility).
In terms of firm size it is argued that the large firms can demonstrate a consistent past 
business history, thus making it easier for banks to evaluate their credit quality (Kn-
yazeva, A., Knyazeva, D. 2012). Hence, increased information transparency can lower 
the incidence of collateral. A study by Grunert and Norden (2012) shows that large firms 
pledge less collateral because they have more bargaining power and can borrow from 
different sources with better credit terms. Menkhoff et al. (2006) show that younger 
firms need to provide more collateral for bank loans, as they are considered unstable. 
Similarly, Chakraborty and Hu (2006) find that older firms are more transparent than 
smaller ones, resulting in older firms pledging lower collateral. 
Berger and Udell (2002) report that SMEs suffer from information asymmetry due to 
lack of availability of audited financial statements, which may cause SMEs to be credit 
rationed. Ferri and Murro (2015) find that audited financial statements can minimize 
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information asymmetry and influence easy access to finance. Similarly, a research by 
Leon (2015) from 69 developing countries finds that firms having audited financial 
statements are more transparent and it is easier for them to access loans from external 
lenders. Considering the above studies from the point of view of access to finance, it 
may be possible to say that having audited financial statements may reduce information 
asymmetry and that may lessen collateral burden to SMEs. In contrary, audit reports 
may also increase collateral requirements for firms, as information transparency al-
lows banks to evaluate the firm more accurately, which can result in higher collateral 
requirements depending on the credit quality of the firm. Therefore, we can expect both 
positive and negative effects of audited financial statements on collateral. Additionally, 
firms with tangible assets have more information transparency than those of the service, 
retail or innovation oriented business sectors, making it easier for lenders to assess their 
credit risk (Gompers 1995). A. Knyazeva and D. Knyazeva (2012) find that firms with 
asset tangibility receive loans with lower interest rates; they argue that asset tangibility 
signals easy loan recovery in the event of default. In this regard, we may argue that 
as manufacturing firms have more tangible assets than other business types, they may 
pledge lower collateral due to greater information transparency. 
According to the agency theory, firms with more concentrated ownership and those 
owned and managed by the same person have minimum or, at times, zero agency costs 
(Jensen, Meckling 1976; Fama, Jensen 1983). Ang (1992) shows that firms with con-
centrated ownership tend to have long-term orientations and strive for survival and 
reputation, therefore, less agency related conflicts. Moreover, it is difficult to enforce 
loan recovery if several people own the firm (Hanedar et al. 2014). Hanedar et al. find 
that sole ownership firms pledge lower collateral than of the corporations. It is possible 
that firms with less concentration would make enforcement weaker, thus increasing 
collateral requirements. Therefore, we expect to find a negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and collateral pledges. 
Borrower experience and gender is also considered as important determinants of collat-
eral-based lending. Hsiao and Chou (2015) show that experienced borrowers can man-
age businesses more efficiently than inexperienced borrowers manage and minimize the 
credit risk of loans. Neuberger and Rathke-Doppner (2015) find that younger borrowers 
pledge higher collateral due to the lack of business experience compared to older, more 
experienced borrowers. Grunert and Norden (2012) argue that a skilled and experienced 
borrower has more bargaining power with banks and, therefore, it is possible to relax 
strict credit terms such as interest rate. At the same time, experienced managers of 
older firms can prepare better loan proposals and use their past business track records 
to lower collateral requirements (Berger, Udell 1995). Considering the above arguments, 
it is more likely that an experienced borrower may use his/her bargaining power and 
previous skills to minimize strict credit terms and collateral requirements on loan con-
tracts. However, Duarte et al. (2017) did not find any statistically significant effects of 
borrower experience on collateral.
Studies show that because of sexual stereotyping and gender discrimination, female-
owned firms face stricter credit conditions from banks compared to male-owned firms 
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(Carter, Rosa 1998). Boyer and Blazy (2014) find that default rates are higher for wom-
en-owned firms than those that are male owned. Moreover, Garwe and Fatoki (2012) 
find that female-owned firms have difficulty in accessing financing because they lack 
sufficient management skills. Alesina et al. (2013) find that women-owned firms in Italy 
pay higher interest rates than male-owned firms. Thus, it is possible that banks assume 
that women-owned firms are risky. Therefore, we expect to find a positive relationship 
between female ownership of firms and pledge of collateral. Belluchi et al. (2010) find 
that SMEs owned by female borrowers in Italy are required to provide higher collateral, 
which increases financial barriers on women-led SMEs.
A widespread collection of studies report that innovative firms encounter strict credit 
conditions in the form of credit rationing, lower maturity of loans and higher collat-
eral requirements compared to non-innovative firms because innovative firms are more 
information opaque (Freel 2007; Lee et al. 2015). Additionally, it is difficult to dem-
onstrate the quality of innovative projects due to intellectual properties concerning in-
novation activities (Hall 2010). Moreover, Moore and Garnsey (1993) contend that it is 
difficult to measure returns from innovation activities and estimate cash flows with any 
precession. Considering the above theories related to innovative firms and financing, we 
assume that innovative firms may pledge more collateral in compared to non-innovative 
firms because of uncertainties in their capital commitment as well as higher asymmetric 
information.
Prior studies on the observed risk hypothesis suggest that when the quality of the bor-
rower is known and risky, more collateral is required due to the higher credit risk of the 
loan. Hanedar et al. (2014) used liquidity risk, overdue payments and crime as proxies 
for borrower risk and found that these factors have a positive correlation with the pres-
ence of collateral. Jimenez et al. (2006) used borrower loan defaults as observed risk 
proxies in the Spanish market and found that loan defaults have a positive correlation 
with collateral, thus supporting the observed risk hypothesis. Moreover, the quality of 
the firm is measured through the availability of international quality recognition, such as 
ISO certification. Availability of such certification indicates higher firm quality (Hanedar 
et al. 2014). In this paper, we used liquidity risk, crime and ISO certification as proxies 
for borrower observed credit quality and expect to find a positive relationship between 
liquidity risk and crime with collateral and a negative relationship with ISO certification. 
1.2. Loan characteristics
Studies on collateral-based lending suggest that loan size and duration significantly af-
fect the presence of collateral. Large loans are usually secured because of the high-risk 
perception (Godlewski, Weill 2011). Moreover, a large loan increases the leverage of a 
firm and may increase the likelihood of default (Leeth, Scott 1989; Avery et al. 1998). 
Hence, it is important for banks to secure loans by asking for collateral from borrowers 
(Degryse, Van Cayseele 2000). Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) also find that large 
loans are collateralized, whereas Hernandez-Canovas and Martinez-Solano (2006) show 
that small loans are usually provided based on the relationship between the bank and 
the borrower. 
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With respect to loan maturity, long-term loans are riskier than short-term loans. Long-
term loans may induce moral hazards and adverse selection problems due to the longer 
loan period and, hence, loan maturity is positively correlated to collateral (Harhoff, 
Korting 1998; Voordeckers, Steijvers 2006; Hainz et al. 2013; Duarte et al. 2017). Ad-
ditionally, longer periods may induce borrowers to shift from less risky to high-risk pro-
jects (Jensen, Meckling 1976). Shorter loan maturity can control borrowers’ risk shifting 
behaviour by minimizing the moral hazard problem (Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D. 2012). 
Researchers frequently measure the observed risk hypothesis and validate the adverse 
selection theory using the relationship between loan spread and collateral. When bor-
rower quality is observable as risky, borrowers need to provide more collateral and 
need to incur higher interest rates (Bester 1985; Besanko, Thankor 1987). Brick and 
Palia (2007) find that loans secured with collateral need to afford 200–400 basis points 
higher interest rates than the non-secured loans. Berger and Udell (1990) suggest that 
risky borrowers need to provide collateral and are charged higher interest rates. There-
fore, according to the observed risk hypothesis, we expect to find a positive relation-
ship between collateral and interest rates. Regarding the adverse selection hypothesis, 
quality borrowers may provide more collateral to obtain loans with lower interest rates 
through signalling their superior credit quality; hence, collateral acts as a substitute for 
lower interest rates (Bester 1985; Besanko, Thakor 1987). Degryse and Van Cayseely 
(2000) find a negative relationship between interest rates and collateral, supporting 
the adverse selection theory. Godlewski and Weill (2011) argue that both the adverse 
selection and observed-risk hypotheses can be validated depending on the degree of 
information asymmetry in the loan market. However, they also find strong support for 
the observed-risk hypothesis and borrower quality. 
1.3. Lender market characteristics
Bank competition and concentration is widely used in banking studies to determine their 
impact on collateral requirements. Berlin and Butler (2002) argue that as competition 
in the market intensifies, lenders need to relax lending terms, for example, lower ex-
pected collateral ratios due to less market power. Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) find 
that bank competition reduces collateral requirements because borrowers can switch to 
other banks to obtain loans with better lending terms. Conversely, Jimenez et al. (2009) 
find that in a competitive market, banks can increase collateral ratios in an attempt to 
increase their superiority over competitors in a loan contract. Hainz et al. (2013) re-
port that requiring collateral in a loan contract is more likely when the market is less 
competitive, the assumption is that competition and concentration is negatively associ-
ated. Jimenez et al. (2006) find that bank concentration is negatively correlated with 
collateral. In a concentrated market, a bank can use its market power to attract quality 
borrowers more efficiently than in a competitive market. 
Bank-borrower distance is also a significant determinant of collateral requirements in 
a loan contract. Berger and Udell (2002) in their theoretical model showed that soft 
information collection is critical in SME lending and is obtained by continuous inter-
action with borrowers. However, the cost of collecting site-specific soft information 
about the borrower increases with the distance between bank and borrower (Petersen, 
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Rajan 2002). Therefore, banks choose between their most cost-efficient options, such as 
screening the borrower or asking for collateral to alleviate organizational diseconomies 
(Manove et al. 2001). Jimenez et al. (2009) find that lenders ask for more collateral 
from local borrowers, whereas distant borrowers pledge lower collateral. They argue 
that banks conduct strict credit screening processes while lending to a distant borrower, 
which reduces the incidence of collateral. A later study by Hainz et al. (2013) shows 
that loans granted to distant borrowers are more likely to be collateralized than loans 
granted to local borrowers. It is argued that local lenders have superior information 
about firms closer to the bank and, as a result, it is easier for local lenders to evaluate 
the credit risk of the firms. Regardless of these studies, the effect of distance on col-
lateral requirements is still inconclusive and in this paper, we show new evidence from 
the Visegrad countries. 
A summary of collateral based studies concentrated on the firm characteristics, loan 
characteristics and lender market characteristics in different countries are presented in 
the following table. 
Table 1. A summary of studies based on firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and lender 
market characteristics and their impact on collateral requirements on SMEs 
Study Country Variable Results
Knyazeva A.  
and Knyazeva D. 
(2012)
USA Firm size Large firms pledge less collateral due to 
better information quality.
Grunert and 
Norden (2012)
USA & 
Germany
Firm size Large firms pledge less collateral because 
of more bargaining power.
Chakraborty and 
Hu (2006)
USA Firm age Firm age has a negative impact on 
collateral.
Menkhoff et al. 
(2012)
Thailand Firm age Younger firms need to pledge higher 
amounts of collateral than of the older 
firms.
Gompers (1995) USA Asset tangibility Asset tangibility has a negative effect on 
collateral.
Hanedar et al. 
(2014)
27 transition 
countries
Ownership 
structure as 
a measure of 
agency costs
Ownership concentration has a negative 
effect on collateral.
Steijvers et al. 
(2010)
USA Family and  
non-family firms 
as proxies for 
agency costs
Family firms pledge more collateral due to 
agency issues.
Neuberger and
Rathke–Doppner 
(2015) 
Germany Borrower 
experience
Experienced borrowers pledge less 
collateral.
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Study Country Variable Results
Berger and Udell 
(1995)
USA Borrower 
experience
Negative effect on collateral.
Duarte et al. 
(2017)
29 developed 
and emerging 
countries
Borrower 
experience
Borrowers experience has no effect  
on collateral.
Belluchi et al. 
(2010)
Italy Borrower gender 
(female)
Female borrowers provide more collateral 
than the male borrowers do.
Hanedar et al. 
(2014)
27 transition 
countries
Borrower 
observed risk
Risky borrowers need to pledge collateral 
on their loan application.
Godlewski and 
Weill (2011)
31 developing 
and developed 
countries
Borrower 
observed risk
Borrower observed risk profile has a 
positive effect on collateral.
Leeth and Scott 
(1989)
USA Loan size Large loans are secured due to high–risk 
perception by the banks.
Voordeckers and 
Steijvers (2006)
Belgium Loan size Positive effect on collateral.
Hernandez–
Canovas and 
Martinez–Solano 
(2006)
Spain Loan size Small loans are based on relationship 
lending.
Harhoff and 
Korting (1998)
Germany Loan maturity Long-terms loans are provided with 
collateral security.
Voordeckers and 
Steijvers (2006)
Belgium Loan maturity Longer maturity has a positive relationship 
with collateral.
Duarte et al. 
(2016)
Portugal Loan maturity Long-term loans are collateralized due  
to moral hazard issue.
Besanko and 
Thakor (1987)
USA Loan interest rate Positive impact on collateral.
Brick and Palia 
(2007)
USA Loan interest rate Positive results on collateral due to 
borrower observed-risk profile.
Voordeckers and 
Steijvers (2006)
Belgium Bank competition Negative effect on collateral because of 
other competitors and less holding power.
Jimenez et al. 
(2009)
Spain Bank competition Banks would like to create their 
superiority over other lenders by taking 
collateral. Hence, positive effect on 
collateral.
Hainz et al. (2013) 70 developed 
and 
developing 
countries
Bank 
concentration
Positive results on collateral.
Jimenez et al. 
(2009)
Spain Bank-Borrower 
distance
Local borrowers pledge more collateral 
than the distant ones.
Hainz et al. (2013) 70 developed 
and 
developing 
countries
Bank-Borrower 
distance
Distance borrowers pledge higher 
collateral.
End of Table 1
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2. Data, method and variables
2.1. Data
The data set we used for our analysis was obtained from the latest version of the BEEPS 
V survey, which was a joint project of the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (EBRD) and the World Bank (WB) conducted from 2012–2014. The BEEPS 
survey was first conducted in 1999 in 26 countries by covering about 4000 firms. The 
latest version of the BEEPS survey was completed in 30 transition economies, includ-
ing Russia, to examine the business environment conditions of the enterprises. The data 
set covers 15,883 enterprises that include micro, small, medium and large firms. All 
firms’ related variables are obtained from the BEEPS survey and to examine the effect 
of bank market structure on collateral we included data from the Beck et al. (2000), 
Global Financial Database.
The BEEPS data set covers 254 firms in the Czech Republic, 268 firms in the Slovak 
Republic, 542 firms in Poland and 310 firms in Hungary. However, as the aim of this 
paper is to examine collateral requirements in the segment of SMEs only, we eliminated 
non-SME firms. We have defined SMEs according to the conventions of both OECD 
and BEEPS as firms with less than 250 employees. By doing so, we obtained 239 firms 
in the Czech Republic, 260 in the Slovak Republic, 518 in Poland and 294 firms in 
Hungary, totalling 1,311 SMEs for our descriptive analysis. Among these 1,311 SMEs, 
492 firms had loan information with collateral requirements. 
2.2. Method and variables
The aim of this paper is to find the determinants of collateral. Collateral is a binary de-
pendent variable, which indicates its presence in a loan contract. Considering the nature 
of our dependent variable, we employed logit regressions for our analysis following 
Hainz et al. (2013), Jimenez et al. (2006) and Berger et al. (2011). Our full empirical 
model is as follows:
 
( )  2 1
3
Pr Collateral 1 firm characteristics  loan characteristics
 lender market characteristics , i
= = β + β +
β + ε
   (1)
where Collateral is a binary dependent variable that takes a value of one if the loan is 
collateralized, and zero otherwise. ei is the usual error term. Moreover, b1 firm char-
acteristics, b2 loan characteristics, and b3 lender market characteristics are set of inde-
pendent variables to determine their impact on our dependent variable (Collateral = 1).
2.2.1. Independent variables
To examine our model on the incidence of collateral, we group our independent vari-
ables into three categories: firm-specific, loan-specific and lender market characteristics. 
In Table 2, we present a definition and source for each variable.
With respect to the first group of firm-specific factors, we examine four inverse prox-
ies for information asymmetry: Size (number of full-time employees), Age (number of 
years the firm has been operating), Audit (1 if external auditors check the firm financial 
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statement, and 0 otherwise) (Berger, Udell 2002; Chakraborty, Hu 2006; Ortiz-Molina, 
Penas 2008; Menkhoff et al. 2012; Duarte et al. 2017). By following the related stud-
ies, we also consider firm size, age, audit report as inverse proxies for information 
opacity, and expect to find a negative association with collateral. To examine the effect 
of asset tangibility in minimizing information asymmetry, we include Manufacturing 
firms (1 if the firm is a manufacturing firm and 0 otherwise) (Gompers 1995). To ex-
amine the impact of agency costs in collateral requirements (Hanedar et al. 2014), our 
model includes Ownership concentration (percentage ownership of the firm held by 
the largest shareholder). As discussed elsewhere, ownership concentration may have 
a negative effect on collateral requirements due to less agency related issues, since 
the owner is most likely the manager of the firm’s. To examine the effect of borrower 
experience in collateral based lending, we include Experience (years of experience of 
the top manager) (Duarte et al. 2017). To measure gender-based discrimination in col-
lateral based lending, we include Female (1 if one of the firm owners is female, and 0 
otherwise). Empirical research finds that female owners face greater restrictions from 
banks (Belluchi et al. 2010). To examine financial constraints on innovative firms in the 
form of higher collateral, we include Innovation (1 if the firm introduced new products 
or services during last three years, and 0 otherwise). Finally, to measure the borrower 
observed-risk hypothesis, we examine three proxies for borrower risk: Quality, Crime 
and Liquidity. Quality is 1 if the firm has an internationally recognized quality certifi-
cate, and 0 otherwise. Crime is 1 if the firm has experienced any losses because of 
theft, robbery, vandalism or arson, and 0 otherwise (Hanedar et al. 2014; Duarte et al. 
2017). Liquidity measures the percentage of credit sales over total sales, as more credit 
sales can increase the possibility of liquidity crisis (Hanedar et al. 2014). These above 
studies argue that firms observed risk profile could have a positive impact on collateral.
To examine the impact of loan characteristics and the presence of collateral, we esti-
mate three loan-specific variables: LoanSize, LoanMaturity and InterestRate. LoanSize 
is loan amount in dollars (Godlewski, Weill 2011), LoanMaturity is loan duration in 
months (Jimenez et al. 2006) and InterestRate is the annual cost of the loan in percent-
age (Hanedar et al. 2014). According to the moral hazard theory, we expect to find a 
positive relationship between loan size and loan maturity with the presence of collateral. 
However, as discussed earlier with interest rates, we can validate both the adverse selec-
tion and observed-risk hypotheses. 
This paper examines three lender market characteristics and their impact on the pres-
ence of collateral. City is 1 if the firm is located in the capital city, and 0 otherwise 
(Hanedar et al. 2014). City is included in the analysis because it is expected that firms 
located in the capital city may experience lower collateral requirements from banks, as 
the capital city is usually the financial hub of the country and, hence, distance will be 
lower between the banks and borrowers. BRc (number of bank branches per 100,000 
adults) (Duarte et al. 2017) is also included as a proxy for bank-borrower proximity 
(inverse to distance). We expect to find a negative relationship between number of 
bank branches and collateral. As increased number of bank branches may reduce bank-
borrower distance and that may increase information collection efficiency, it may lead 
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to a reduction of dependency on collateral. Finally, yet importantly, as an inverse proxy 
to bank competition, we included C R (asset share of the largest three banks in total 
banking system assets) (Hanedar et al. 2014). If the market is highly concentrated, we 
may find a positive relationship between concentration and the incidence of collateral. 
Detailed selection of variables can also be seen in Table 1. 
Table 2. Definition and sources of variables
Variable Definition Source
Collateral Equals 1 if the firm has pledged collateral to obtain an 
external loan (0,1)
BEEPS
Firm characteristics
Age Age of firm, measured as the number of years that the firm 
has been operating
BEEPS
Size Size of the firm, measured as the number of full-time 
employees
BEEPS
Audit Equals 1 if the firm financial statement is checked by 
external auditors (0,1)
BEEPS
Manufacturing Equals 1 if the firm is a manufacturing firm (0,1) BEEPS
Ownership Percentage ownership of the firm held by the largest 
shareholder
BEEPS
Experience Experience of top manager measured in years BEEPS
Female Equals 1 if one of the firm owners is female (0,1) BEEPS
Quality Equals 1 if the firm has an internationally recognized quality 
certification (0,1)
BEEPS
Innovation Equals 1 if the firm has introduced any new products within 
the last three years
BEEPS
Crime Equals 1 if the firm has experienced any losses as a result of 
theft, robbery, vandalism or arson (0,1)
BEEPS
Liquidity Credit sales over total sales (%) BEEPS
Loan characteristics
LoanSize Loan amount measured in US dollars BEEPS
LoanMaturity Loan duration in months BEEPS
InterestRate Loan annual cost (%) BEEPS
Lender market characteristics
City Equals 1 if the firm is located in the capital city (0,1) BEEPS
CR The asset share of the three largest banks in total banking 
system assets
Beck et al. (2000)
BRc Number of bank branches per 100,000 adults Beck et al. (2000)
Note: This table presents variable definitions and sources of the data set. BEEPS = Business Environ-
ment and Enterprise Performance Survey.
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3. Results 
3.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents the results of descriptive statistics for our full sample of firm and also 
shows country-level segmentation. With respect to all firms, 432 had collateral informa-
tion and about 70% of the SMEs pledged Collateral for their most recent loans. Thus, 
the preliminary data suggests that pledging collateral is quite common for SMEs in the 
Visegrad countries. It is not surprising that only 34% have financial statements verified 
by external auditors (Audit). This result also supports the existing literature that SMEs 
usually cannot produce audited financial statements, which we have already discussed. 
Descriptive statistics also suggest that firm structure in our sample possesses a high 
concentrated ownership pattern (mean of Ownership is 77%). We can also see that about 
40% of the firms have at least one owner who is female (Female) and 19% reported 
that they incurred losses due to theft, robbery or vandalism. Moreover, it is noticeable 
from table 2 that only 31% of the SMEs conduct innovation activities, which suggests 
SMEs are reluctant to develop new products or make any changes in their existing 
product lines. 
With respect to loan characteristics, LoanMaturity ranges from 1 month to 300 months, 
which suggests a huge dispersion between loan maturities. Considering the InterestRate, 
on average, firms pay about 8.5% on their borrowings. However, the maximum loan 
cost is about 70%, indicating that, at times, SMEs pay an extremely high cost for loans. 
Variables regarding lender market characteristics suggest that about 19% of firms are 
located in the capital city (City), implying that firms in our sample countries are geo-
graphically distributed rather than concentrated in the capital. The average number of 
bank branches (BRc) per 100,000 adults is 26 and ranges from 15 to 32 branches in 
our sample countries. A higher number of bank branches indicate less distance between 
the banks and borrowers, which reduces bank organizational diseconomies in the loan 
screening process. Finally, the mean value of CR is about 73%, suggesting that the 
banking industry in our sample countries is highly concentrated.
In our country level segmentation, the survey result suggests that 75% of firms in the 
Czech Republic and 76% in the Slovak Republic and Hungary pledged collateral (Col-
lateral) on their loan. However, only 56% of firms in Poland pledged collateral on 
their loans. Regarding audit reports, 47% of firms in the Czech Republic and Slovak 
Republic have audit reports (Audit) and 46% of firms in Hungary have their statements 
audited. However, only 15% of firms in Poland have audited their financial statements. 
The survey result also suggests that ownership structure of firms in the Czech Republic 
are highly concentrated (Ownership about 84%), which is highest among the countries. 
Descriptive statistics also highlight that firm-level innovation is lowest in Slovak firms 
(18%), whereas about 50% of the SMEs in the Czech Republic reported that they have 
introduced new products during the last three years excluding the year when the survey 
was conducted. Surprisingly, 36% of firms in the Czech Republic (highest) reported 
that they had experienced losses due to theft, vandalism or arson (Crime), whereas only 
12% of firms in Hungary (lowest) reported they had losses due to criminal activities. 
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Considering InterestRate, firms in the Czech Republic pay the lowest interest rates 
(mean interest rate is 5.79%), whereas interest rates are highest in Poland (mean inter-
est rate is 10.84%). Results regarding bank concentration (CR) suggest that the bank-
ing industry is extremely concentrated in the Slovak Republic (94.67%) and Hungary 
(85.22%). It signals that banks in these countries may use their market power to increase 
financial constraints to SMEs. 
3.2. Empirical results and discussion
In Table 4, we present logit regressions results on the incidence of collateral. We esti-
mate three regressions by using different sets of independent and control variables for 
our analysis. The first regression reports all firm characteristics and their impact on the 
presence of collateral. The second regression includes all loan characteristics with firm 
characteristics. The third regression reports all lender market characteristics along with 
firm characteristics excluding loan characteristics. 
Regarding the firm-level determinants of collateral, we find that firm size (Size) has a 
positive effect on collateral. However, we find a negative relationship between firm age 
(Age) and collateral. The positive coefficients of firm size with collateral did not meet 
our expectation. We hypothesized that large firms are more information transparent than 
the smaller ones, which may help the large firms to avail loans with lower collateral 
requirements. Nevertheless, our result suggests that large firms pledge more collateral 
compared to smaller firms. This result is similar to those of Hanedar et al. (2014) and 
Steijvers et al. (2010). It can be that larger firms prefer to demonstrate credit quality 
by providing more collateral. Hence, collateral can act as a signalling device for the 
large firms by which it could be possible that they can lower the loan interest rates. On 
the other hand, it is also possible that number of employees, as a measure of firm size 
may not be appropriate to determine the incidence of collateral. A firm can have many 
employees but may still lack audited financial statements or unable to show satisfactory 
business information to the bank to minimize information asymmetry that can reduce 
the incidence of collateral. The negative coefficients of firm age (Age) and collateral 
suggest that mature firms pledge less collateral than the younger firms do. This result 
is in line with our expectation and corroborates with the findings of Chakraborty and 
Hu (2006); Hanedar et al. (2014) and Duarte et al. (2017). As prior studies suggest, it 
is easier for the older firms to show past business information, thus reducing collateral 
requirements. Furthermore, according to relationship lending theory, older firms can 
engage in long-term relationships with their banks that can reduce collateral for small 
businesses (Berger, Udell 1995). 
With respect to audit report (Audit), we did not find that audited financial statements had 
any significant effect on collateral requirements. It could be that audit reports may not 
reflect the overall business condition of firms, and therefore banks do not consider audit 
reports as sufficient information asymmetry tools for collateral-free loans. The negative 
coefficient of manufacturing (Manufacturing) firms and collateral suggests that firms 
with more tangible assets pledge lower collateral than other types of firms. Hence, our 
result supports the idea that manufacturing firms can show greater information trans-
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parency than firms with fewer tangible assets. It could be the fact that asset tangibility 
can increase bank efficiency in evaluating the credit risk of firms, making it easier for 
banks to recover loans by liquidating tangible assets (Gompers 1995; Knyazeva, A., 
Knyazeva, D. 2012). Thus, banks ask for lower collateral from the firms those possess 
a significant amount of tangible assets.
Considering the ownership (Ownership) structure of firms and the incidence of col-
lateral, we find a positive significant result, which is opposite to our expectation. The 
result suggests that banks are taking restrictive measures in terms of holding collateral 
from concentrated firms. It could be possible that concentrated firm ownership increases 
the possibility of agency costs, as argued by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Addition-
ally, risk-shifting behaviour may be more likely in concentrated firms due to individual 
holding power in the management of the firms. Steijvers et al. (2010) find that family 
firms pledge more collateral in comparison to non-family firms due to the free riding 
problem of family members in the business. Hence, this reasoning may also apply to 
our sample of firms, as SMEs are more likely to be managed and operated by individual 
or family members. 
Our estimation result for female ownership (Female) of firms is positively associated 
with collateral in all regression specifications. This suggests that female-owned firms are 
more likely to provide collateral compared to male-owned firms in our sample countries. 
There can be a few explanations for this result. First, banks perceive female-owned 
firms as riskier because they often have less experience in business management and 
more attachment with the family than the business (Garwe, Fatoki 2012; Boyer, Blazy 
2014). Second, female-owned firms usually lack a past business record and, hence, 
receive strict credit conditions from banks (Irwin, Scott 2010). Third, Alesina et al. 
(2013) report that female borrowers have less bargaining power than male borrowers, 
which may cause women borrowers to accept loans with higher collateral requirements. 
Finally, it could also be the fact that female owners in our sample of firms manage firms 
that require higher collateral. However, we did not examine this possibility in this paper, 
which could be an interesting topic for future research.
We did not find any effect of borrower experience (Experience) on the incidence of 
collateral. Therefore, we may say that borrower experience in Visegrad countries is 
not a determinant factor for banks while deciding for granting loans to a particular 
borrowers and asking for collateral. Our result is also aligned with the result of Duarte 
et al. (2017), where they did not find any significant effect of borrower experience in 
collateral requirements for SMEs. 
According to our expectation, we find a positive effect of firm innovativeness (Inno-
vation) on collateral requirements but the result is not statistically significant. We hy-
pothesized that innovative firms are more information opaque in comparison to non-
innovative firms and need to pledge more collateral to reduce information asymmetry. 
However, the insignificant results suggest that collateral constraints on innovative SMEs 
are no more than on non-innovative ones. Thus, innovation activities do not create 
borrowing constraints for SMEs at least in the form of higher collateral requirements. 
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With respect to the borrower observed-risk hypothesis variables Quality, Crime and 
Liquidity, we find a significant result only in the case of crime, whereas quality and 
liquidity have an insignificant effect on collateral. The positive coefficients of crime 
and collateral suggest that firms with a track-record of losses due to theft, robbery, van-
dalism or arson must pledge more collateral due to their high-risk perception. Hence, 
in accordance with past literature, we provide evidence that when borrower quality is 
observable as risky, banks require more collateral (Berger, Udell 1990; Jimenez et al. 
2006; Godlewski, Weill 2011; Hanedar et al. 2014; Duarte et al. 2017) to protect their 
loan portfolio (Blazy, Weill 2013). Thus, borrower observed-risk has a positive effect 
on collateral in the Visegrad countries. 
Table 4. Logistic regression on the presence of collateral
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Collateral (1/0); logit Collateral (1/0); logit Collateral (1/0); logit
Firm characteristics
Size 0.007(0.003)* 0.002(0.007)* 0.007(0.004)**
Age –0.001(0.016)** –0.013(0.034) –0.009(0.017)
Audit 0.307(0.251) 0.348(0.481) 0.085(0.262)
Manufacturing –0.0368(0.382)* –0.504(0.452)* –0.230(0259)*
Ownership 0.004(0.005)** 0.002(0.009)* 0.004(0.005)*
Experience 0.018(0.013) 0.052(0.026) 0.018(0.013)
Female 0.540(0.245)** 0.568(0.474)** 0.436(0.246)**
Innovation 0.057(0.246) 0.455(0.447) 0.186(0.252)
Quality 0.482(0.252) 0.572(0.482) 0.491(0.262)
Crime 0.025(0.262)** 0.040(0.473)** 0.065(0.265)**
Liquidity 0.008(0.003) 0.006(0.005) 0.011(0.003)
Loan characteristics
Ln (LoanSize) 0.031(0.007)
LoanMaturity 0.008(0.006)*
InterestRate 0.071(0.031)**
Lender market characteristics
City –0.486(0.306)*
CR 0.022(0.010)**
BRc –0.002(0.025)
Constant –1.464(0.686)*** –0.404(1.024) –2.587(1.364)*
Observations 430 126 430
Log-Likelihood –474.083 –141.17 –468.908
Pseudo-R Square 0.135 0.217 0.15
Source: Authors’ own estimation. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level indicated by *, 
** and ***, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3 (Model 2) reports the loan characteristic variables and their impact on the like-
lihood of pledging collateral. We find a positive result for all three loan characteristic 
variables – LoanSize, LoanMaturity and InterestRate – on the incidence of collateral. 
However, we find significant results for loan maturity and interest rates but insignificant 
results for loan size. The result suggests that loans with longer maturity are more likely 
to pledge collateral than short-term loans. It can be that long-term loans may induce 
risk-shifting behaviour in managers (Jensen, Meckling 1976). Long-term loans may 
also create moral hazard problems, provoking banks to ask for collateral (Duarte et al. 
2016). Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) find that long-term loans are collateralized 
with fixed assets in the Belgian market. Thus, longer maturity signals higher risk for 
banks and requires collateral safety to assure that the borrowers will not engage in any 
activities that is contradictory with the interest of the banks. The positive coefficients 
of interest rate with collateral are evidence that risky borrowers are required to pro-
vide more collateral and pay higher interest rates; hence, we show further evidence of 
the borrower observed-risk hypothesis (Bester 1985; Chan, Kanatas 1985; Brick, Palia 
2007; Godlewski, Weill 2011). Hence, we can propose that there is an inter-relationship 
between observed credit quality, interest rates and collateral. It might be the case that 
when information asymmetry is low, a bank may screen its borrowers more thoroughly 
and any evidence of risky nature can induce banks to ask for more collateral and charge 
higher interest rates to compensate their investments. Therefore, the evidence from the 
Visegrad countries suggests that interest rates and collateral act as complementary rather 
than substitute of each other. 
With respect to lender market characteristics, we find significant negative results for 
City and positive coefficients for CR. However, coefficients for BRc are negative but not 
statistically significant. The negative coefficients for City suggest that firms located in 
the city are closer to the banks, which may reduce the probability of pledging collateral. 
It could be that a shorter distance may help in mitigating the information gap between 
the banks and borrowers. As a result, banks may require less collateral from borrowers 
that are closer to their branch. Therefore, our results also corroborate with the prior find-
ings of Hainz et al. (2013) that firms located closer to banks are financed via screening 
and distant borrowers need to pledge collateral because of information opacity. It can be 
that a shorter distance increases bank efficiency in the loan screening process because 
the credit officer can travel to the firm more frequently and acquire firm-specific soft 
information, as asserted by Agarwal and Hauswald (2010). The positive coefficients of 
CR suggest that firms in a concentrated market need to provide more collateral than in 
a competitive market. Therefore, we can say that in a concentrated market, banks may 
use their market power to increase collateral requirements for small businesses. Our 
results are in line with those of Duarte et al. (2017), who also find a positive effect of 
bank concentration on collateral. It might be that by asking for collateral, banks in a 
concentrated market could reduce their screening efforts and associated costs. Thus, as 
argued by Manove et al. (2001), concentration may increase the “lazy” behaviour of 
banks, as they rely more on collateral to provide small business loans. 
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Conclusions
Collateral requirements on a loan contract are particularly significant for SMEs rather 
than the large firms because SMEs are information opaque and collateral can act as a 
signalling device for borrowers to show their credit quality, which can ease access to 
financing and strict loan conditions. Similarly, by asking for collateral, a bank can mini-
mize its loss exposure in the event of loan default and provide protection from borrower 
moral hazards. Hence, collateral has important implications for both borrowers and 
lenders on a loan agreement. However, SMEs possess fewer assets that can be pledged 
as collateral and, hence, SMEs face credit rationing from banks. In this paper, we ex-
amine the determinants of collateral on SME financing in the context of four central 
European countries, or Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Poland 
and Hungary). The data set was obtained from the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank (WB) Business Environment and En-
terprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), wave V, which was conducted from 2012–2014. 
We also complemented the BEEPS survey data with indicators from the Beck et al. 
(2000), Global Financial Database. This paper investigates the incidence of collateral 
by focusing on three main areas: firm characteristics, loan specific variables and lender 
market characteristics. 
Our results suggest that large firms, ownership concentration, firms owned by females 
and firms with a past business record of losses due to theft, robbery, vandalism or arson 
are more likely to pledge collateral on their borrowings. However, the probability of re-
quiring collateral is lower for older and manufacturing firms, which may be due to lower 
information asymmetry. Therefore, we provide evidence that reduction of information 
asymmetry can play a significant role in alleviating collateral requirements for SMEs. 
The negative association between firm age, manufacturing firms and the incidence of 
collateral supports our claims. We show that firms affected by criminal activities are 
more likely to pledge collateral because of their high-risk perception. Hence, borrower 
observed-risk characteristics could induce collateral on a loan contract. Our results also 
support that the ownership concentration increases the likelihood of pledging collateral. 
Thus, banks perceive firms managed by the owner or owned by a few people as riskier 
due to risk-shifting behaviours of individuals and, hence, banks ask for more collateral 
to align the interest of the borrower with the interest of the banks. We also find evidence 
that firms owned by female borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral in comparison 
to male-owned firms. Therefore, we can infer that banks in our sample countries treat 
female-owned firms as riskier than those owned by their male counterparts. 
We also find that loans granted for a longer period are more likely to be secured with 
collateral. Therefore, it may suggest that long-term loans are riskier than the short-term 
loans. Similarly, collateral requirements are higher for loans with higher interest costs. 
These results provide evidence that borrower observed credit quality is a main factor 
inducing collateral requirements on a loan contract. 
It is also noticeable that firms located in the capital city are less likely to provide col-
lateral on their loan contract. Therefore, it seems that shorter distance alleviates the 
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information gap between the banks and borrowers. Finally, we find empirical evidence 
that banking concentration increases collateral requirements for SMEs. Thus, we can 
say that concentration is not ideal for SMEs to obtain loans with lower collateral, as 
in a concentrated market, a bank can exploit its market power to impose stringent col-
lateral requirements. 
By considering the significance our results, it is worth to mention that the current re-
search brings several new insights in collateral based lending in the segment of SMEs. 
Such as, this paper examines the determinants of collateral by using a unique dataset 
that has not been used in any earlier research. Furthermore, unlike previous research, 
this paper not only shows empirical results considering the firm characteristics but also 
from the perspective of financial market structure and lending terms in a loan contract. 
We also show disadvantage for distant and female borrowers in collateral based lending 
which is quite scant in the past literature. 
The results of the current paper provide a few implications for policy makers. First, 
taking effective measures to increase bank competition can create a level playing field 
for other banks and may reduce strict collateral requirements for SMEs. Second, banks 
can lower collateral requirements for female-owned firms, which can encourage more 
female entrepreneurs to access bank loans. Finally, regulators may take initiatives to 
reduce the interest rate for SMEs that can foster SME growth and therefore contribute 
to the economy. Further studies are required to understand the ratio of collateral to loan 
and the impact of market structures that induce a high ratio of collateral for SMEs. 
Similarly, this study has not analysed which type of collateral is preferable for SME 
loans – personal or business – hence, we leave that for future studies. 
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